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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 




TIME INSURANCE COMPANY, ( 
Defendant-Appellant. } 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
11659 
Action by plaintiff on a group insurance policy 
to recover expenses of accidental illness. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Trial court sitting without a jury entered judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff and denied defendant's mo-
tion to amend judgment to no cause of action in favor 
of defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of trial court's judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At all times pertinent to this cause of action, 
plaintiff and Richard D. Martinez were partners do-
ing business through a corporation known as Garden 
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Art, Inc. The plaintiff and Mr. Martinez were mem-
bers of the Utah Association of Nurserymen and as 
such became insured under a group policy which de-
fendant negotiated with said association. The policy 
provided coverage for losses arising from accidental 
injury or illness. The group policy was issued to be-
come effective on June 1, 1967 and premiums there-
on were to be paid quarterly (EX. P4). The policy 
(EX. P5) and the members individual certificate 
(EX. P4) by their terms provided that an individual 
member's coverage would terminate "on the date any 
renewal premium is due, if the required premium 
for the Member is not paid." 
The initial premium payment for the coverage 
of both the plaintiff and Mr. Martinez was paid April 
25, 1967 by check of Garden Art, Inc. drawn by Mr. 
Martinez (EX. P7). The second quarterly premium 
payment for both the plaintiff and Mr. Martinez was 
also paid by a Garden Art, Inc. check drawn by Mr. 
Martinez on October 5, 1967 (EX. PS), four days 
after expiration of the 31 day grace period. The third 
quarter premium payment became due December 1, 
1967 and the 31 day grace period expired January 1, 
1968. Neither the plaintiff nor Mr. Martinez, nor 
anyone on their behalf, paid their third quarter pre-
mium payment prior to expiration of the 31 day grace 
period ( R. 53 & 57). No attempt was ever made to 
reinstate Mr. Martinez' coverage (R. 68). Neither the 
plaintiff, nor anyone on his behalf, made any request 
to defendant company for an extension of the time 
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in which to pay his quarterly premium payment 
which became due December 1, 1967 (R. 5 & 20, 58, 
72). 
On February 6, 1968, plaintiff's wife telephoned 
D1·. Harold Lamb regarding plaintiff's ulcer condi-
tion ( R. 19 & 23, 60) and on February 8, plaintiff 
was submitted to the St. Mark's Hospital with the 
chief complaint of "nausea and vomiting and upper 
abdominal pain for about 48 hours" (EX. Dll, R. 
62). However, plaintiff had experienced the symp-
toms for which he was hospitalized for as long as a 
week prior to February 6, when his wife called Dr. 
Lamb ( R. 61, 65) and perhaps as long as two weeks 
prior to his hos pi taliza ti on ( R. 66). After talking to 
Dr. Lamb on February 6, plaintiff's wife on Febru-
ary 7 (EX. D12) mailed a letter (EX. D13) request-
ing reinstatement of the policy and a check in the 
amount of the quarterly premium (EX. D14), both 
of which were dated February 5. Defendant's pre-
mium accounting department was unable to identify 
the account and, therefore, on February 20 wrote 
to the plaintiff requesting his group or policy number 
(EX. D16). The plaintiff (R. 74) responded by not-
ing his group and individual number on the bottom 
of defendant's letter and returning it to the defend-
ant. After identifying the account, defendant by 
letter of February 29 (EX. Dl 7) advised plaintiff 
that his coverage had lapsed as of December 1, 1967 
since the quarterly premium payment due on that 
date had not been received during the thirty (31) 
<lay grace period and enclosed its check to refund the 
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February 5 payment made by plaintiff's wife. A re-
instatement application was also enclosed for plain-
tiff's use in applying for reinstatement of his cover-
age if he desired to do so. The reinstatement appli-
cation was never returned to the defendant. 
At no time between the quarterly premium due 
date of December 1, 1967 and February 7, 1968 
when plaintiff's wife r:aailed the check dated Febru-
ary 5, did anyone advise defendant company of the 
symptomatic flare-up of plaintiff's ulcer condition 
which necessitated his admission to the hospital on 
February 8 (R. 64). Plaintiff's wife made no men-
tion of said condition in her note mailed February 7 
(EX. D13) and plaintiff made no mention of his 
condition on the note he appended to defendant's 
letter of February 20, 1968 (EX. D16). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF'S COVERAGE TERMINATED BE-
FORE LOSS WAS INCURRED. 
There is no dispute of the fact that the third 
qua1te1· premium payment due on or before Decem-
be1· 1, 1967 was not paid by that date, or before ex-
piration of the 31 day grace period. Likewise, there 
is no dispute of the fact that plaintiff never request-
ed an extension of time in which to pay the third 
quarter premium. Therefore, the first question to be 
answered is: \Vhat legal effect should be given to 
the policy's automatic termination provision, i.e., 
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"INDIVIDUAL TERMINATION: The in-
of any Member shall terminate : ( 1) 
on the date any renewal premium is due if the 
required premium for the Member is not paid; 
. . . " ( 'l'he provision contains no notice re-
quirement.) 
If the automatic termination provision of a 
policy does not specify that notice of cancellation be 
given to the insured, then no such notice is required 
to effect termination of coverage. In Rogers vs. 
Colurnbia National Life Insurance Cornpany, 213 
N.W. 757 (Iowa 1927), the quarterly premium was 
not paid when due or within the 31 day grace period. 
Payment was tendered 22 days after expiration of 
the grace period and the company notified the insured 
that reinstatement would be necessary and mailed an 
application for such. The insured died before receiv-
ing the company's letter. The policy provided: 
"Upon default in payment of any premium, 
... this policy shall lapse, and the company's 
only liability shall be such, if any, as is herein-
after provided." 
The plaintiff (beneficiary) contended that the termi-
nation clause made the policy voidable only, and not 
void, and that formal declaration of forfeiture and 
notice to the insured should have been given. The 
Iowa Supreme Court in sustaining the trial court's 
summary judgment in favor of the insurance com-
pany stated on this point: 
"Declaration and notice were clearly not con-
templated by the contract and were not re-
quired." 
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In Kehoe vs. Automobile Underwriters, 12 F. 
Supp. 14 (D.C.M.D. Penn. 1935), the insured wru 
charged with notice of the forfeiture provisons of 
his policy which rendered it void for nonpayment of 
premiums. In Schick vs. Equitable Life Assuranc1 
Society, 59 P.2d 163 (Cal. 1936), the court held that 
the policy provision providing for a 31 day grace peri-
od during which time the policy should be kept in 
force and that the payment of a premium during 
the grace period would not maintain the policy in 
force beyond the date when the succeeding premium 
became payable provided for the policy to terminatf 
automatically without any action on the part of tht 
company upon nonpayment of the premium on its 
due date. And in Long v. Monarch Accident Insur-
ance Company, 30 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1929), it ap· 
pears that the general rule of long standing is that in 
the absence of a special agreement (such as a notice 
of cancellation provision) the failure to pay an insur· 
ance premium when due ipso facto forfeits the policy 
unless there is an amount of money absolutely due the 
insured with which the company could pay the pre· 
rnium. This case involved the failure of an insured 
to pay a quarterly premium on a health and accident 
policy and apparently the policy did not contain a 
cancellation notice provision. The court in affirming 
the directed verdict of the trial court stated: 
"We start with the general principal that in 
the absence of a special agreement, failure to 
pay an insurance premium when due ipso facto 
forfeits the policy. (Cases cited)." 
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POINT II. 
DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE THE AUTO-
MATIC FORFEITURE PROVISION OF ITS 
POLICY. 
Since plaintiff does not contend that the third 
quarter premium payment was made before expira-
tion of the grace period or that an extension of the 
grace period was requested or granted, the only re-
maining question is: Did defendant waive the auto-
matic forfeiture provision of its policy. 
At trial, plaintiff argued that since defendant 
had accepted the second quarter premium payment 
four days after expiration of the grace period it 
waived the automatic forfeiture provision of the 
policy with respect to the third quarter premium pay-
ment which was mailed 38 days after expiration of 
the grace period. The general rule is, however, that 
an insurer, at its option, may elect not to declare a 
forfeiture by accepting overdue premium payment 
and still not waive the requirement that future pay-
ments be made when due. Section 32 :293 of Couch 
011 Insurance 2d reads as follows: 
"An insurer is not obligated to insist upon a 
forfeiture when it occurs; rather, it may, at its 
option, elect to continue the policy in force. 
Furthermore, the right to enforce a forfeiture 
for nonpayment of a premium or premium note 
is not necessarily waived by mere silence or 
inaction on the part of the insurer. Again if, 
by the terms of the policy or certificate, the 
non-payment of a premium or assessment on 
the day specified operates ipso facto to termi-
nate the contract, the failure of the insurer 
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to declare a forfeiture of the policy for non-
payment of the premium or assessuent does not 
waive the requirement for prompt payment." 
Also, it appears to be a rule of long standing that 
the acceptance of an overdue premium while the in-
sured is in good health does not waive forfeiture of 
the policy when a subsequent overdue premium pay-
ment is made when the insured is in bad health or 
after a loss has occurred. Grossman vs. Massachusetts 
Beneficial Association, 9 N.E. 753 (Mass. 1887); 
Ronald vs. Mutual R. F. Life Association, 30 N.E. 739 
(N.Y. 1892); Hutchinson vs. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Society, 335 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1964). As 
stated in Thomspon vs. Fidelity Mutual Life Insur-
ance Company, 92 S.W. 1098 (Tenn. 1906): 
"A permission to pay a p1:emium after due date 
during the life and good health of the insured 
is not equivalent to a permission to pay after 
his death. It is well settled that a course of 
dealing between the parties, under which the 
insured accepted overdue premiums when the 
insured was in good health, will not give his 
representative or himself the right to pay or 
tender his premiums after maturity, and he 
is in a bad state of health, or had died. 
* * * 
"The reason of this is, there has been an in· 
crease in the risk or hazard. An insurer might 
be willing to accept an over-due premium and 
re-instate an insured when his condition of 
health is the same as when the policy was 
originally issued, but it can.not be argued from 
this that it should be required to remsurance 
or reinstate the same person when he was or 
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is in extremis. The course of dealing, if any, 
to accept the overdue premiums from a 
hve man, not a dead one." (or an ill one). 
The foregoing rationale is somewhat moot since 
a course of dealing with a man in either a good or 
a bad state of health could hardly be established by 
an insurer excepting one overdue premium payment. 
As stated in Couch on Insurance 2d Section 32 :391: 
"Since a few cases or intermittent acts do 
not constitute a custom or usage waiving a re-
quirement of prompt payment, it mamfestly 
follows that a custom or usage is not estab-
lished by the mere fact that the policy provision 
was waived or ignored on one occasion. Conse-
quently, evidence of the acceptance of one sin-
gle over-due premium or assessment is insuffi-
cient of itself to establish a custom which will 
bar the insurer from claiming a forfeiture for 
non payment of subsequent premums or assess-
ments .... " 
In the same treatise at Section 32 :379 are listed 
many cases or situations where a custom or usage to 
accept late premium payments has been established, 
but there is not a single case annotated therein where-
in such a custom or usage has been predicated upon 
accepting one previous overdue payment. 
Also, another fact which precludes a finding of 
usage between the parties necessary to predicate an 
estoppel based on reliance is that the previous over-
due payment was paid by plaintiff's partner, Mr. 
Martinez, (R. 53) and consequently, plaintiff would 
have had no knowledge of whether it was paid before 
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or after expiration of the grace period. At trial plain-
tiff testified that he did not even know that the third 
quarte1· premium became due on December 1, 1967 
( R. 56) although in answer to leading questions pro-
pounded at the taking of his deposition, he acknowl-
edged such facts, but it is questionable as to whether 
or not he actually knew of the fact at the time the 
premium payment was due. 
Regarding the change in plaintiff's health, the 
record is also clear that there was a substantial 
change for the worse after expiration of the grace 
period and before the third quarter premium pay-
ment was mailed. The grace period expired January 
1, 1968 and although the plaintiff contended that he 
had suffered from his ulcer syndrome since inception 
of the policy, he admitted on cross-examination that 
these symptoms had not been severe enough to require 
his hospitalization (R. 67) and even during exami-
nation by his own counsel, admitted that the symp· 
toms for which he was hospitalized had existed for 
only one or two weeks prior to his hospitalization 
on February 8, 1968, (R. 66), which would 
mean that they commenced approximately three 
weeks after expiration of the grace period. The de· 
fendant was never advised of the change in plaintiff's 
health (R. 73-74) and, therefore, could not have vol-
untarily waived an increase in the risk by accepting 
the overdue premium payment mailed February 7, 
1968. As stated in 56 Am. Jur., Waiver, Section 2, 
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a waiver must be the the intentional relinquishment 
of a known right. The defendant could not have in-
tentionally relinquished its right to declare a for-
feiture of the policy and avoid an increased risk when 
it had no knowledge of the facts which increased the 
risk, i.e, plaintiff's nausea, vomiting, and upper ab-
dominal pain which commenced on February 6, forty-
eight hours prior to his hospitalization on February 
8, 1968. (Ex. D-11, R. 62). 
The only other fact on which a waiver could 
possibly be predicated is that defendant cashed the 
check mailed by plaintiff's wife on February 7, 1966 
and held the funds until they were returned by de-
fendant's check on February 29, 1968. However, it 
is clear from defendant's letter of February 20, 1968 
(Ex. D-16) that it did not accept the check uncondi-
tionally, but only on the basis that the account could be 
identified and found to be in good standing. As soon 
as the letter was received back with plaintiff's nota-
tion of the policy number, defendant with its letter 
of February 29 (Ex. D-17) refunded the February 
7 payment and enclosed an application for reinstate-
ment, which was never returned. 
A leading Utah case on this point is BaUard v. 
Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 82 Utah 1, 21 P. 
2cl 84 7 ( 1933). In that case, the insured's life insur-
ance policy had lapsed for nonpayment of premium, 
and, after becoming ill, the insured mailed the over-
due premium with interest to the insurance company 
shortly before his death. Not knowing of the in-
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sured's recent illness and death, the insurance com-
pany deposited the check in its account in the usual 
course of business, but sent the insured an application 
for reinstatement since the policy had lapsed. The 
insured died before receiving the reinstatement ap· 
plication. After learning of the insured's death, the 
insurance company refunded the overdue premium 
payment and denied liability under the policy. The 
trial court granted judgment for plaintiff and the 
insurance company appealed. The Utah Supreme 
Court reversed, finding no waiver had taken place. 
The court quoted extensively from Cooley's Briefs 011 
Insurance, Vol. 5, 2d Ed., which in part stated: 
"A waiver of default cannot be predicated on 
the acceptance of past due premiums after the 
death of the insured, if the insurer is ignorant 
of the fact of death ... It may be said that as a 
general rule the acceptance of a past due pre-
mium on the condition that the insured is in 
good health or that he furnish a certificate of 
good health, is not such an acceptance as will 
waive the forfeiture, such condition not being 
copmlied with ... A waiver as to a prior for· 
feiture will not arise, where a life or accident 
insurer accepts premiums without knowledge 
at the time of the insured's death, or serious 
illness, or serious injury ... A letter informing 
the insured of his right to reinstatement, and 
offering to reinstate on compliance with the 
conditions of which such right depends, is not 
a waiver, the conditions not being complied 
with, ... " 
As in the Ballard case, defendant herein did not 
know that ulaintiff had become acutely ill on Febru· 
i 
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ary 6 necessitating his admis3ion to the hospital on 
February 8 for an operative procedure when it re-
ceived the check mailed February 7, since it was not 
received until February 9 (Ex. Pl. reverse side). As 
soon as the payment was identified as being made on 
a policy which had already lapsed, the amount there-
of was refunded by the defendant and he was sent 
an application for reinstatement, which was never 
returned. 
CONCLUSION 
The policy provided for automatic forfeiture in 
the event of nonpayment of quarterly premiums when 
due. The December 1, 1967 quarterly premium was 
not paid when due or within the 31 day grace period 
and no extension of the grace period was requested or 
granted. Therefore, plaintiff's coverage terminated 
as of December 1, 1967 pursuant to the terms of the 
policy. A waiver or estoppel can not be predicated 
upon the fact that the insurance company previously 
accepted one quarterly premium payment four days 
after expiration of the grace period since ( 1) the 
payment was made by plaintiff's partner rather than 
by plaintiff, (2) a custom or course of dealing cannot 
be established by one transaction, and (3) the previ-
ous overdue quarterly premium payment made four 
days after expiration of the grace period was while 
plaintiff was still in relatively good health, whereas 
the second overdue premium payment mailed 38 days 
after expiration of the grace period was not received 
b,v defendant until after plaintiff had been admitted 
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to the hospital for surgery. Likewise, a waiver 
cannot be predicated upon the fact that defendant 
cashed the overdue premium payment check since it 
was accepted conditionally pending identification of 
the account and was refunded as soon as it was deter-
mined that the policy on which it was paid had lapsed. 
WHEREFORE, appellant and defendant below 
prays that judgment of the trial court be reversed 
and that it be awarded its costs incurred herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant-
Def endant 
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